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Abstrat
Modern high-performane omputing relies heavily on the use of om-
modity proessors arranged together in lusters. These lusters onsist of
individual nodes (typially o-the-shelf single or dual proessor mahines)
onneted together with a high speed interonnet. Using luster ompu-
tation has many benets, but also arries the liability of being failure
prone due to the sheer number of omponents involved. Many eetive
solutions have been proposed to aid failure reovery in lusters, their one
signiant downside being the failure models they support. Most of the
work in the area has foused on deteting and orreting fail-stop errors.
We propose a system that will also detet more general error models,
suh as Byzantine errors, thus allowing existing failure reovery methods
to handle them orretly.
1 Introdution
In reent years, building lusters of heap, ommodity proessors for high-
performane omputation has beome the dominant alternative to using expen-
sive, high-performane proessors. At present, lusters dominate the superom-
puting market - the latest TOP500 list onrms that the fastest 10 omputers
in the world are all built using the luster paradigm, the highest performing
at a maximum speed of over 90 TFlops[1℄. Clusters are now used extensively
for sienti omputations by organizations suh as Lawrene Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory, National Center for Superomputing Appliations and the
Los Alamos National Laboratory, as well as for business appliations by om-
panies suh as Google[2℄.
1.1 Trade-o for speed - Cluster failure rate
One ommonly ited problem with lusters built from ommodity hardware is
the omponent failure rate. While single omponent failure rate may be aept-
able for individual use - having a MTTF of thousands of hours, in a mahine that
employs a very large number of suh omponents, suh as IBM BlueGene, one
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may expet to see a omponent failing every day[3℄. This represents a diulty
due to the nature of luster omputing, where eah individual node is responsi-
ble for some essential part of the omputation. The luster ommunity is well
aware of this problem and many error reovery protools have been proposed and
developed, suh as rollbak reovery, log-based reovery (pessimisti, optimisti
and ausal) and repliation[4℄ . Pakages suh as MPICH-V[5℄, Charm++[6℄
and others oer support for fault-tolerant omputing environment.
1.2 Fault Models
In order for a fault-tolerant environment to be eetive, it must support a good
mix of fault models. Currently, three fault models have been proposed.
1.2.1 Fail-Stop Faults
This model represents the simplest fault to diagnose and is also the one most
frequently assumed by existing fault-tolerane pakages. Under this model, a
node malfuntion an easily be deteted by the other nodes as it stops produing
output. This model orresponds naturally to events suh as omplete hardware
failure (possibly due to power soure failure), or omplete network onnetivity
failure.
1.2.2 Fail-Stutter Faults
This model is a natural extension of the Fail-Stop model. It assumes that a
node may 'stutter', i.e. experiene a drop in performane (full or partial) for
a period of time, then return to normal operation. This model is signiantly
more expressive than the Fail-Stop model, as it addresses node availability in
terms of performane, as well as funtionality[4℄.
1.2.3 Byzantine Faults
This is an extremely adversarial fault model whih assumes that a node, or any
number of nodes may hoose to engage in maliious behavior. Under this model,
no assumptions are made about the ability of other nodes to detet a fault. In
fat, it is most ommonly assumed that a node will ontinue providing output
to the other nodes, but the output will be inorret. Faulty nodes under this
model are allowed to ollude with eah other in order to at in a more maliious
way.
1.3 Motivation - Deteting Faults
Currently, most fault-tolerane pakages deployed either assume a Fail-Stop fail-
ure model or assume a perfet fault-deteting mehanism. In other words, their
fous is mostly on orreting errors that have been deteted. Yet, it has been
suggested that the Fail-Stop model is extremely onstrited and does not ome
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anywhere near reeting the real situation with regards to faults on omputa-
tional nodes in lusters[7, 4℄. Deteting Byzantine faults is signiantly more
diult than deteting Fail-Stop faults due to their insidious nature. In order
to attempt to detet them, it may be helpful to further divide suh errors into
two ategories -
• Transient faults - Non repeating errors whih orrupt the data by reversing
some bits. These errors are typially aused by situational events suh
as inidental eletromagneti interferene, 'ground boune' and external
radiation[8℄.
• Permanent faults - Faults aused by hardware or software defets (due to
aging, external damage, or sabotage), whih will ause error in omputa-
tion to repeat aross exeutions.
One approah that has been suggested for detetion of Byzantine errors is to
use error-deteting versions of ommonly omputer algorithms suh as matrix
operations [12℄ and Fast Fourier Transform data ompression [10℄. While this is
a viable approah, it is more reative than proative. In partiular, it requires
reating fault-tolerant versions of ommonly performed omputations, inurring
signiant overhead in time and resoures required to perform the omputation.
We feel a dierent approah should be taken to deteting permanent fault.
Our approah is to diagnose misbehaving nodes in the luster and report their
behavior to the agent in harge of error reovery, so that the neessary steps,
suh as data roll-bak and reloating the omputation to a dierent node an
be taken by the system.
2 Diagnosing Faults By Challenging the System
Instead of ustomizing individual algorithms to tolerate faults, we propose to
reate a parallel appliation whih will detet whih parts of the system funtion
inorretly through an algorithm in whih the nodes seek to derive a solution to a
fairly light-weight problem representative of the luster workload. The results of
the omputations are then ompared to eah other. Based on that omparison,
a deision is made whether or not ertain nodes behave in a manner whih
is not orret. Our algorithm will support detetion of faults under all three
models presented in setion 1.2 of this report. As a side eet, it will also detet
any problems existing on the ommuniation interonnet, whih previously has
been assumed to be fault-free. We see the following design riteria as essential
elements for our fault-detetion algorithm
• Lightweight - Above all, the use of the appliation should not signiantly
degrade the performane of regularly sheduled tasks on the luster. While
this may seem like a tough requirement to ahieve, it is not neessarily so,
sine diagnostis need not be run at very high frequeny.
• Non-deterministi - The appliation should use a randomized data set in
order to eliminate the possibility of fake responses
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2.1 The Byzantine Generals Problem
Deteting Byzantine errors within a large omputing luster is not a simple
task, and any proposed algorithmi solution needs to be baked by rigorous
mathematial proof. Fortunately, oping with Byzantine faults in a luster
an be reasoned about abstratly as the Byzantine Generals Problem. In this
abstration, every node in a luster is represented as a soldier in the Byzantine
army. Any soldier who makes a deision about what ation to take is alled a
general and all other soldiers are lieutenants. Communiation between soldiers
is aomplished by passing messages. The soldiers will ommuniate with eah
other to form a ommon plan of ation (attak or retreat), but some of the
soldiers are loyal and some are traitorous. The traitorous soldiers may be trying
their hardest to prevent the loyal generals from reahing a ommon agreement.
An algorithm is needed so that all loyal generals deide upon the same plan of
ation and a small number of traitors annot ause the loyal generals to adopt
a bad plan[13℄.
2.1.1 The Byzantine General Problem as formulated by Lamport et
al[13℄.
A ommanding general must send an order to his n-1 lieutenant generals suh
that:
IC1: All loyal lieutenants obey the same order
IC2: If the ommanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys
the order he sends.
2.1.2 Solution Constraints
Lamport et al.[13℄ oer an elegant solution to this problem whih provides de-
tetion of up to m traitors given 3m + 1 or more generals. The solution uses a
message system whih has the following onstraints:
A1: Every message that is sent is delivered orretly.
A2: The reeiver of a message knows who sent it.
A3: The absene of a message an be deteted.
2.1.3 A solution to the Byzantine General Problem: OM(m)
• m represents the number of soldiers.
• The possible ations are ATTACK or by default RETREAT.
Algorithm OM(0).
1. The ommander sends his value to every lieutenant.
2. Eah lieutenant uses the value he reeives from the ommander, or uses
the value RETREAT if he reeives no value.
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Algorithm OM(m), m > 0.
1. The ommander sends his value to every lieutenant.
2. For eah i, let vi be the value Lieutenant i reeives from the ommander,
or else be RETREAT if he reeives no value. Lieutenant i ats as the
ommander in Algorithm OM(m - 1) to send the value vi to eah of the n
- 2 other lieutenants.
3. For eah i, and eah j ~ i, let vj be the value Lieutenant i reeived from
Lieutenant j in step (2) (using Algorithm OM(m - 1)), or else RETREAT
if he reeived no suh value. Lieutenant i uses the value majority (vl . . .
. . v,-1 ).
2.2 The System Wide Detetion Algorithm
First, we redue the problem of Byzantine fault detetion to the Byzantine
Generals problem. Then, we provide a system wide distributed algorithmi
solution whih redues to the OM(m) algorithm. By showing equivalene in
this way, our algorithm is proved to be sound and provide error detetion of up
to m node failures in a luster of at least 3m+1 nodes.
Given an arbitrary network of N nodes we let eah node maintains a table of
reliability estimates for every node in the system. We onstrut a virtual token-
ring network where a single token is passed around the network sequentially
and ylially from node 1 to 2 to ... to N -1 to N to 1. The token is passed
periodially at a predetermined frequeny; the period of this rotation is referred
to as the epoh time. The token has a payload onsisting of: a ounter whih
is inremented every time it is passed, a reliability table similar to the one
held by every node, the sender's ID, the reeiver's ID, and a heksum over
the data. The urrent token holder is analogous to the general and all other
nodes the lieutenants. When a node G holds the token it is responsible for
performing the network wide hallenge. Node G generates a hallenge and
broadasts the hallenge to all other nodes (the hallenge algorithm is detailed
in setion 2.5). The other nodes respond to node G and node G uses the results
of the hallenge to update its reliability table. Node G then passes the token
to the next node in the ring, node G+1 (where +/- is losed within the ring
modulo N), and simultaneously broadasts its reliability data to every other
node in the network. This is aomplished with a a single token broadast.
When the other nodes reeive the broadast, they ompare the reliability data
generated by node G to their urrent reliability data. If the hange in eah value
does not orrespond to the expeted hange of eah data being deterministially
raised or lowered then the table is onsidered orrupt, and the loal reliability
table is not updated. This is neessary as we must assume that inorret data
is the result of a traitorous node attempting to orrupt the reliability tables of
the loyal nodes.
In order to satisfy the message system onstraints put forth by Lamport et
al.[13℄, some problemati situations must be addressed. First, if node G is a
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traitor, it may not pass the token along to node G+1. To aount for this,
every node has a timer whih is reset when it reeives a token. When node G-1
broadasts a token suessfully, all nodes note the suess of node G-1 and reset
their timer. If node G fails to broadast the token, node G+1 will timeout one
period after the node G-1 broadast. At the timeout, node G+1 will notie that
the last broadast it reeived was from node G-1, and node G+1 will perform
the hallenge followed by the next token broadast. Node G+1 will also redue
the reliability estimate for node G in its reliability data. All other nodes will
notie that their own ID does not equal G-1+2=G+1, so they will reset their
timers and expet a hallenge and token broadast from node G+1 next. If
node G+1 fails to generate reliability broadast and passes the token then node
G+2 will noties this failure and generates a hallenge and token broadast. This
proess an our for any length sequene of nodes in the ring without ausing a
ommuniation failure or breaking the onsisteny model. Additionally, if some
node G sends out a hallenge, but does not broadast a token, then node G+1
will timeout one period after G-1 performed the token broadast and proeed
as detailed above.
Another problem that may our is when a traitorous node generates a
spurious broadast out of order. This ould happen if node G beomes very
slow, thus allowing the next node in the ring to time out and generate a new
token broadast, but node G nishes its work and generates a broadast after
node G+1. When this ours, every node will ignore the inorret broadast.
The nodes will know to ignore the broadast beause the expeted sender ID
does not math the reeived sender ID.
Finally, a traitorous node may fail to respond to a hallenge. This is oun-
tered by the urrent head, node G, timing out after a predetermined length of
time following its hallenge broadast. After broadasting a hallenge, node G
will either reeive all of the hallenge responses or timeout waiting for traitorous
nodes to respond. Node G then updates the reliability table penalizing those
nodes whih failed to respond and broadasts the next token. Assuming that
messages an be guaranteed with a heksum, setion 2.4 details how the algo-
rithm satises the requirements of a messaging system as dened by Lamport
et al.[13℄.
2.3 Algorithmi Equivalene to OM(m)
2.3.1 The ommander sends his value to every lieutenant.
This is ahieved via the token broadast. The urrent token holder broadasts
his updated reliability table to every other node, as detailed in setion 2.2
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2.3.2 For eah i, let vi be the value Lieutenant i reeives from the
ommander, or else be RETREAT if he reeives no value.
Lieutenant i ats as the ommander in Algorithm OM(m -
1) to send the value vi to eah of the n - 2 other lieutenants.
Every node that reeives the token broadast updates its loal reliability table
with the table embedded in the token. If a node does not reeive the broadast,
it will time out and leave its loal reliability table unhanged. This is equivalent
to the default ation RETREAT. Upon a token broadast, the node sequentially
following the urrent token holder in the ring beomes the head node and repeats
the algorithm.
2.3.3 For eah i, and eah j ~ i, let vj be the value Lieutenant i re-
eived from Lieutenant j in step (2) (using Algorithm OM(m -
1)), or else RETREAT if he reeived no suh value. Lieutenant
i uses the value majority (vl . . . . . v,-1 ).
After the head node sends out a hallenge broadast it waits for responses until
all are reeived or a time out ours. The head node then tallies the responses
and hooses the majority response as the orret response and updates its loal
reliability table based on this value. This is a diretly analogous to 2.3.3.
2.4 Conforming to Lamport's Message System Constraints
2.4.1 A1: Every message that is sent is delivered orretly
The heksum over every message probabilistially ensures that in the unlikely
event of message data orruption, any reipient will ignore the message. The
reliability of the sender will be redued by any reipients of the orrupt message,
so the malformed message is observed by reipients as if sent by a traitorous
node. If message orruption persists due to permanent network failure, the
reipients will eventually redue the reliability of the sending nodes below the
reliability threshold and the aeted nodes will be marked as traitorous. This
does not preisely satisfy onstraint A1, but it is suient in apturing the
orret notion of reliability in a physially realizable system. When performing
luster based omputation, it is essential to alert the user to any failures, network
based or node based. Our algorithm simply aggregates both node and network
failure types into general failures. In the presene of transient network failure,
the reliability of a node will only be marked down during the transient failure.
Its reliability will rebound as soon as the transient fault disappears. Similarly,
permanent link failure is observably no dierent then a faulty node failing to
respond. The solution to this problem is detailed in setion 2.2. Therefore,
assuming that a heksum is suient to detet network based data orruption,
and network orruption and link failure are observably no dierent then the
same behavior resulting from faulty nodes, every message that is sent is delivered
orretly, or is observed as node failure. The onsequene of this is that failing
network links resulting in K observed node failures redue the detetion of at
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most m failing nodes in a network of size 3m+1 to the detetion of at most
|m-K| nodes in a 3m+1 node network.
2.4.2 A2: The reeiver of a message knows who sent it.
Every message that is sent inludes the ID of both the sender and the reeiver,
so a reeiver always knows the reported ID of the sender from the reeived
message. The only unertainty arises when a sender lies about its identity; a
sender an simply write the ID of another node into the sender eld of the
message. This problem is easily remedied by employing a basi publi key
ryptography system. First, every node must be provided with the publi key
of every other node in the system. Seond, a sender must enrypt a portion of
every message before transmission, and every message reipients must use the
publi key orresponding to the laimed sender's ID to attempt deryption of
the data. Finally, if the message ontents an be derypted then the sender's
authentiity is guaranteed to some very high probability determined by the
strength of the ryptographi system. We have not implemented this system,
but doing so is very straight forward. Instead, our working model does not allow
for nodes to lie about their identity whih ensures that the reeiver of a message
knows who sent it.
2.4.3 A3: The absene of a message an be deteted.
This is ensured via the timeout sheme detailed in setion 2.2. In summary,
when a message is expeted but not reeived before a predened duration of
time, a timeout ours and the algorithm makes forward progress ignoring the
lost message.
2.5 The Challenge Algorithm
The hallenge response system must provide a means of disovering failing nodes
and marking them as faulty. At the simplest, every node should have a broad
range of omputation to perform. The omputation should be broad enough to
inlude various register and memory aesses, every possible operation within
the FPU, and a broad range of operations performed by the ALU. Eah opera-
tion should depend on the result of the previous operation, and the nal result
should be a salar value. This helps to maximize the probability of disovering
a failing node if only a small portion of the proessor is broken, suh as an FPU
divider.
The urrent general, node G, is in harge of generating one pseudo-random
data set for every node to run the hallenge on. Upon reeiving a token pass
and beoming the general, node G waits one epoh time before transmitting
the hallenge broadast. The other nodes reeive the broadast, perform the
hallenge algorithm, and then send the omputed result bak to node G. Any
node whih does not reply before a timeout period is onsidered to be faulting.
Node G ompares all returned results, inluding its own results of the hallenge
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and selets the majority value to be the orret value. Node G then updates its
reliability table reduing the reliability of all nodes whih failed to respond and
all nodes whih did not return a value equal to the majority value. Node G also
inreases the reliability of all nodes whih agree with the majority value.
We have hosen to implement the hallenge algorithm as a series of matrix
operations. Speially, both the oating point and the integer matrix undergo
gaussean elimination into redued row form. One in redued row form, the
rows of the matrix are summed together, while the olumns are multiplied
1
.
The resulting olumn produts are then summed together, as are the resulting
row sums. For eah matrix, the quotient of the sum of the produts and the
sum of the sums is derived. Finally, the quotient of the oating point matrix is
divided by the quotient of the integer matrix to arrive at a single number. This
sequene of operations was seleted beause it an be performed relatively fast,
is widely inlusive in the operations required to perform it, and given dierent
data, onverges to dierent results. Additionally, its use of matrix redution is
typial of a sienti omputation workload on a luster, whih frequently deals
with matrix operations.
The ideal algorithm for performing the reliability update is both system and
appliation dependent. The simplest method is to pik a large onstant d and
let the reliability range from ompletely reliable 1.0 to ompletely unreliable
0.0. When a node's reliability should be dereased it is dereased by 1/d, and
when it should be inreased it is inreased by 1/d. The value is saturated at
0.0 and 1.0 so any inreases above 1.0 or dereases below 0.0 are ignored. More
advaned solutions allow for weights varying by the urrent reliability. Finally,
when the reliability of a node falls bellow a threshold, the node is onsidered
faulty.
2.6 Deteting Fail-Stutter and Fail-Stop Faults.
It should be evident that the sets of all possible fail-stutter and fail-stop faults
are subsets of the set of all Byzantine faults, so detetion of all Byzantine faults
by our algorithm inludes detetion of all fail-stutter and fail-stop faults.
3 The API
Fault tolerane an be added to a system of omputers at the appliation pro-
gramming level, at the programming language level, at the operating system
level, or at the network hardware level. Adding Byzantine error detetion at a
network level would require a great deal of high speed ustom hardware, making
it an impratial solution. However, it would be possible to use our algorithm
to detet faults by writing support into an operating system. The problem with
this approah is that it severely limits the usefulness of the appliation. We
would need to hose a single OS to integrate support into, and then users would
need to run our OS to use the software. Adding support into a programming
1
Ignoring zeros, for the obvious reason.
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language also severely limits the usefulness of our appliation, beause only our
ompiler ould be used to generate the orret ode. The best way to provide
support for a wide range of target arhitetures, operating systems, and net-
works is to provide the programmer with a useful API to interfae with out
appliation.
One of the most universally aepted and used parallel omputing paradigms
is MPI for C. There are many publily available open soure MPI pakages, and
they are easy to use, modify, and add support to beause they all onform to
the same standard interfae, MPI. We have extended parts of MPI in order to
add support for our fault detetion algorithm. In this way, programmers will
be able to easily add omplex fault detetion support to their appliations by
using our API, SafeMPI, an extension of MPI.
4 Desription of Implementation
4.1 Transpareny
One of the stated goals of developing a API-based fault-detetion algorithm is
providing funtionality that is transparent to the user. Using this requirement
as a guideline, we implemented only three publi funtion alls whih provide
the user with aess to the funtionality neessary to make SafeMPI a useful
tool. These funtions are the initialization funtion MPI_Safe_init, the termi-
nation funtion MPI_Safe_Finalize and the reliability sore reporting funtion
Safe_get_sore. MPI_Safe_Init and MPI_Safe_Finalize need to be alled
only one by the user program in plae of standard MPI_Init and MPI_Finalize
alls. Safe_get_sore must get alled every time the user wishes to perform
reliability heks or omparisons in their ode. Additionally, the user must de-
lare an instane of data type safe_strut whih is passed to every SafeMPI
all.
4.2 Data types
All ommuniations performed by SafeMPI will be done using typedef message
types, whih are mirrored with dened MPI data types. The enapsulating data
type used for all messages is message_type, dened as,
strut message_type {
header_type head;
body_type body;
};
The type header_type ontains the header information of the message, with
the following struture,
strut header_type {
unsigned int message_lass;
unsigned int myid;
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unsigned int heksum;
};
message_lass indiates the type of the message being ommuniated (To-
ken, Challenge, Response). myid ontains the group id of the sending proess.
heksum is used for future implementation of message heksums. The type
body_type is in fat a union ontaining the ontents of the three possible mes-
sage types,
union body_type {
token_type tok;
hallenge_type _data;
response_type r_data;
};
Eah of these is dened as,
strut token_type {
unsigned int token_id;
int ur_token_holder;
int new_token_holder;
r_table_type r_table;
};
strut hallenge_type {
float random_float_set[10℄[10℄;
int random_int_set[10℄[10℄;
};
strut response_type {
int soure;
float response;
};
The data type r_table_type is another struture ontaining the reliability table
in array format.
4.3 Initialization and Bakground Operation
One user issues a all to MPI_Safe_Init, MPI_Init_thread is alled to initial-
ize MPI operation. A hild thread is then reated to run bakground reliability
heks in, while the main thread starts the exeution of the user program. All
SafeMPI funtionality is exeuted in this separate thread and using an MPI
ommuniator other than MPI_COMM_WORLD to avoid interferene with user appli-
ation. One initialized, SafeMPI will ontinue exeuting in a loop until halted
by the user appliation. In eah iteration of the loop, the following operations
will be performed on the urrent round's head node:
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1. Generate a 10x10 oat and integer random matrix.
2. Create an instane of hallenge_type with the generated data.
3. Call MPI_Bast to broadast the data to the nodes in the job group.
4. Wait until all responses have been reeived and stored in the responses
array, or until a response timeout ours.
5. If a response timeout ours, set eah node that timed out to the default
wrong value.
6. Sort responses and selet the median response as orret.
7. For eah node, if its response mathes the seleted response, ompute the
new reliability sore using the formula new_score = min(1, old_score +
δ
1
1−old_score/1.5 ), where δ = 0.2. If the response does not math the se-
leted response, ompute the new reliability sore for that node using the
formula new_score = max(0, old_score − δ
1
old_score1.5 ), where δ = 0.22.
8. Generate a new token message ontaining the new reliability table and
new_token_holder with the value (myid + 1)%size, where myid is the
proess id of the urrent head node and size is the size of the job group.
9. Wait for the period of time orresponding to Epoh Time.
10. Call MPI_Bast to broadast the token to every node in the job group.
All nodes that are not the head node in a partiular round will perform the
following operations:
1. Spawn a hild thread hild_thread to listen to broadasts and forward
them to the parent thread.
2. Poll the ommuniator pipe with hild_thread for forwarded messages
for a speied period of time.
3. When data is deteted on the pipe, store the message and hek its
message_type eld.
4. If the message type is a hallenge, then store the hallenge data and use
it to ompute a response value using the generate_response funtion.
One a response is omputed, reate a response_type message and use
MPI_Send to send it to the head node.
2
These partiular funtions were seleted due to their exponential nature. This ensures
that a node whih has a high reliability sore and starts produing bad results will have its
sore lowered very quikly. Likewise, a node with low sore whih operates orretly will
reover its sore to an aeptable level within only a few iterations
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5. If the message type is a token, store the reeived reliability table. For
eah entry in the table, if oldvalue > newvalue, ompare newvalue with
max(0, old_score−δ
1
old_score1.5 ). If oldvalue < newvalue, ompare newvalue
with min(1, old_score + δ
1
1−old_score/1.5 ). If there is a mismath in the
values, disard the table as erroneous.
6. Set the urrent head node to the value of new_token_holder, and leave
loop iteration.
7. If a timeout ours, inrement the urrent head node by one and jump to
next loop iteration.
4.4 Finalization
Upon alling MPI_Safe_Finalize, all open hild proesses is terminated, and a
all to MPI_Finalize is issued.
4.5 User Reliability Cheks
During every iteration of SafeMPI algorithm, after reeiving the updated version
of the reliability table and verifying it as valid, eah node will write the table
to a ommuniator pipe to the parent (user) thread. When the user program
issues a all to Safe_get_sore, the pipe is polled and the data in it is stored
in the parent thread. The sore for the requested node is then returned to the
user.
5 Development and Testing
Our development and testing took plae on NCSA's Uranium luster. The
Uranium luster is a 32-node, IBM eServer, Pentium III test luster administered
and maintained by the Seurity Researh division of NCSA. The luster onsists
of one head and 31 ompute dual proessor nodes. Both 100MB Ethernet and
Myrinet are used to onnet the nodes. After initial analysis and testing, we
thoroughly tested the SafeMPI implementation to determine its performane
overhead and its reliability data onvergene time in a faulty network.
5.1 Performane overhead
SafeMPI oers numerous user ontrollable settings suh as the epoh period,
and timeout durations. The most important of these settings is the epoh pe-
riod whih sets the frequeny of hallenge broadasts. In order to determine how
SafeMPI sales with respet to epoh period and the number of nodes within
a ring, we ran benhmarks on a pratial real-world algorithm, Sobel edge de-
tetion. The Sobel algorithm is widely used to detet and enhane the edges
found within a digital image. Typially, the image is represented by a matrix of
RGB values, and the Sobel operator performs a two dimensional spatial gradient
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measurement to nd and emphasize regions of high spatial frequeny whih are
very likely to be edges[14℄. Sobel performs omputation on onvolution kernels
whih are simply small subsetions of the full matrix representing an image, so
the algorithm parallelizes very naturally. The parallel version moderately relies
on inter-node data ommuniation and an exeute over a predened number
of slowly onverging iterations. These properties make the parallel Sobel algo-
rithm an ideal test andidate for use with SafeMPI. The results of the tests are
detailed in Table 1.
Nodes 20s Epoh Time 30s Epoh Time
6 6.04% 11.43%
12 9.47% 18.63%
Table 1: Exeution time overhead for the Sobel Algorithm using Safe MPI vs
MPI.
5.2 Reliability report onvergene in the presene of fail-
ing nodes.
Failing nodes an be simulated within SafeMPI by probabilistially either or-
rupting a hallenge reply message or by failing to send out either: a token
broadast, a hallenge broadast, or a hallenge reply. Using the reliability
table update mehanism detailed in setion 4.3 and a reliability threshold of
0.30, failing nodes are reliably deteted within 5 or 6 epohs. This is entirely
independent of the use appliation or other SafeMPI parameters.
6 Disussion
Our work on this projet has onvined us that the idea of developing a hallenge-
based fault detetion API has signiant merit. If nothing else, reliability sore
reports an be logged during the duration of the MPI job and examined later
by the user to alert them of an existing hardware problem, as well as the po-
tential ompromise of the results. There are more far-reahing possibilities suh
as integrating reliability heking with luster management tools to allow the
sheduler to intelligently migrate a job o a failing node to a healthy one if a
problem is deteted. These measures ould be potentially very time saving, as
they allow to diagnose a problem provoatively, before a total hardware failure
ours. This is espeially desirable in systems whih do not implement hek-
pointing on non-volatile storage.
However, in spite of the promise that the results of this projet have shown,
we were unable to aomplish everything we initially set out to ahieve. Al-
though it is possible to use SafeMPI in a real-world appliation, as our experi-
ments show, in the urrent state, the library still ontains a number of bugs, the
presene of whih make its use in real-world situations unreommended, and
whih we intend to ontinue to hunt down and eliminate. During the imple-
mentation of our algorithm we have enountered a number of hallenges we did
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not initially antiipate, related diretly to the existing luster tehnology and
MPI standards. Current MPI implementation oer poor support for heavily
asynhronous multi-threaded appliations that invoke simultaneous MPI alls.
That barrier has ompliated our work signiantly.
Furthermore, in its urrent implementation, as demonstrated by our results,
SafeMPI has serious saling issues. In its present state, saling presents too
serious of an issue to onsider using it in prodution environment. In order
to make SafeMPI a viable tool, we intend to identify as many ineienies in
the algorithm as possible and eliminate them. One partiularly disappointing
result is that raising the time between epohs of the algorithm seems to inrease
exeution time as oppose to dereasing it, as one would expet. We suspet
that this is not an inherent property of the algorithm, but rather a fault of the
implementation. Identifying and eliminating the ause of this ourrene is a
very important task on the path toward making SafeMPI a useful tool. Other
tehniques for improving salability and performane issues depend more on the
modiation and optimization of the ore algorithm itself.
On the other hand, one partiular advantage in our method is that, unlike
fault tolerane through thread and hardware level redundany, our overhead is
purely temporal and thus is subjet to optimization. Repliation, while quite
eient in detetion of transient errors, their overhead is bound by the need to
fully repliate the user proess. This is a hard bound whih does not exist in
our implementation of fault detetion, as better and better optimization of the
implementation and algorithm will produe less and less overhead.
7 Conluding Remarks
Many solutions have been proposed to aid failure reovery in lusters, but they
only support the simplest of failure models. Most of the work in the area
has foused on deteting and orreting fail-stop errors, but these errors do not
represent the types of problems enountered within a real luster. In this paper,
we have presented a solution to detet errors using the most robust failure model
available, the Byzantine fault-model.
Our results show that it is possible to detet errors within this substantially
more omplex model and the overhead in doing so remains low for small groups
of nodes. While our results indiate diulty in saling with the number of
nodes, future optimizations and minor hanges to the global algorithm will
most likely yield lower overhead and inreased salability. In the meantime, one
promising approah to saling may be to break the global ring into smaller sub
rings; this redues the error detetion rate but makes the urrent implementation
usable in a large luster.
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